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Abstract 
As with many technologies, carbon capture and storage (CCS) faces social acceptance challenges that can impact the 
pace of its development and deployment. Previous studies on the social acceptance of CCS have tended to rely on 
case studies of pilot projects or surveys of decision makers and the general public. Here, we take a different 
approach, using real world data about the social acceptance of hydraulic fracturing technologies to glean lessons for 
future carbon storage efforts. Hydraulic fracturing has many of the same operations, risks, and social narratives as 
carbon storage, making it a valid comparison. We conduct a statistical analysis on the relationship between various 
state demographic and economic factors and the stringency of state regulations governing the hydraulic fracturing 
industry. As a complement to this analysis, we conduct a comparative case study on the development of hydraulic 
fracturing regulations in New York and Pennsylvania. We find robust statistical evidence that familiarity with the oil 
and gas industry is associated with a decrease in regulatory variance among states where hydraulic fracturing takes 
place. Moreover, we identify a tension between regulatory control of hydraulic fracturing at the state level and 
regulatory control at the local level. This dynamic suggests that carbon storage policymakers and industrial leaders 
should emphasize local engagement in addition to state-level participation. 
 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Any emerging technology presents known and unknown risks that make stakeholders wary. CCS is no exception. 
Safety and efficacy concerns inherent to the carbon dioxide capture, transportation, and storage processes worry the 
public and their representatives, introducing the potential for siting and business development inefficiencies that 
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could prevent the technology from taking root in the marketplace or reaching its full potential as a greenhouse gas 
mitigation strategy. Social acceptance is thus a dual challenge: not only might lack of acceptance prevent facility and 
storage siting for a mature CCS technologies, but it has already revealed its potential for scuttling pilot projects such 
as Barendrecht (Brunsting, et al., 2011) [1], threatening to prevent CCS from germinating in the marketplace at all.  
References to social acceptance are often used synonymously with terms such as Not In My Backyard (NIMBY), 
but the concept is far broader and more multifaceted. While homeowners and communities are indeed important 
elements of social acceptance, so are the firms that carry out carbon storage and hydraulic fracturing, along with 
investors, regulators, politicians, voters, various interest groups, and even the media. In fact, rarely do social 
acceptance challenges take the form of protesters blocking bulldozers. For fossil fuel and mineral utilization 
processes—such as hydraulic fracturing and carbon storage—longstanding compensation practices and unitization 
regulations help to ensure that isolated opposition cannot stymie a project. More often, NIMBY manifests itself in 
the court of law or in the regulation-setting process.  
It is therefore important to understand how grassroots acceptance or opposition to energy projects influences 
regulatory constraints on development. This study adds to the literature in two ways. First, it examines the U.S. 
hydraulic fracturing industry to uncover trends in social acceptance that are not yet apparent in the burgeoning 
carbon storage industry. Understanding how and why hydraulic fracturing regulations vary from state to state could 
serve as an important lesson for carbon storage. Second, it does so by studying how public acceptance is mediated 
through governance structures: the regulations, zoning laws, and public policies that affect new energy development 
efforts such as hydraulic fracturing and carbon storage. Public acceptance of sometimes risky energy infrastructure 
projects is itself difficult to measure, but past research has shown that familiarity with similar types of risks might be 
predictive of acceptance (Singleton, Ansolabehere, and Herzog, 2008) [2]. This new study therefore asks the 
question: “Is a state’s level of familiarity with fossil fuel extraction predictive of its regulatory stringency with 
regards to hydraulic fracturing, and what might this tell us about future attempts to regulate carbon storage?” 
This paper maintains the following structure. The background section explains the logic behind the use of 
hydraulic fracturing as a testbed for CCS social acceptance issues. The statistical analysis section explains the 
methodology and results of our assessment of regulatory differences between states that are relatively familiar with 
the fossil fuel industry and states that are relatively unfamiliar with it. The case study section relies on a comparative 
case study of New York State and Pennsylvania to tease out the more qualitative nuances that the statistical tests are 
unable to detect. Finally, we utilize the conclusions section to interpret our findings and relate them to future 
regulatory directions for carbon storage.  
2. Background: Comparing hydraulic fracturing to CCS 
An empirical examination of public acceptance for CCS, and for carbon storage in particular, is problematic 
because the technology is not yet mature and is largely untested in the commercial marketplace. Those carbon 
storage projects that exist today remain in the pilot or demonstration phase. Therefore, efforts to predict future trends 
in social acceptance for CCS are complicated by the fact that limited data exist from which to extrapolate.  
One approach for predicting the future direction of an emerging technology or industry is to draw on lessons from 
a closely related but more mature field. Previous research has already used natural gas pipeline networks as a case 
study for assessing public acceptance of the transportation infrastructure that would be necessary for commercial-
scale CCS (Marsden and Markusson, 2011) [3]. In our paper, we utilize the hydraulic fracturing industry as a case 
study for the social acceptance of carbon storage. In doing so, we take a broad view on what constitutes the process 
of hydraulic fracturing: as did Burger (2013), we define the practice as not only the actual moment during which an 
operator fractures a shale formation, but also the preceding exploration and mineral rights acquisition as well as the 
subsequent production and waste disposal processes.  
While hydraulic fracturing is an imperfect proxy for carbon storage, the two processes have several similarities. 
In particular, the operations associated with hydraulic fracturing strongly resemble those of carbon storage. Both 
processes use state of the art drilling techniques to create a wellbore extending deep underground: typically 4,000 – 
7,500 feet for hydraulic fracturing (NETL, 2009) [4] and about 5,500 feet for carbon storage (NETL, n.d.) [5]. In the 
case of hydraulic fracturing, water is pumped at high pressure down the new wellbore in order to fracture shale 
formations and extract trapped natural gas. For carbon storage, the wellbore is used to move supercritical carbon 
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dioxide underground to storage sites below shale formations. Just as hydraulic fracturing operations utilize pipelines 
to transport natural gas away from the site, carbon storage operations would use pipeline infrastructure to move 
compressed carbon dioxide to the storage site. Wastewater from hydraulic fracturing operations is injected 
underground for permanent storage, as is carbon dioxide in the case of CCS. Finally, both hydraulic fracturing and 
carbon storage sites are typically sealed and monitored after site activity ceases.  
Being operationally similar, carbon storage and hydraulic fracturing share a number of risks, many of them 
potentially impacting communities near sites. Risks may be categorized according to likelihood and hazard. Highly 
likely but low hazard risks shared by carbon storage and hydraulic fracturing include noise and nuisance from site 
construction, minor reductions in local air quality from site operations, and potentially unwanted changes to the 
local economy. Moderately hazardous and likely risks include the potential triggering of relatively small seismic 
activity, nonthreatening drinking water pollution, and the release of gaseous methane or carbon dioxide from the site 
at levels that are not threatening to health but that could contribute to climate change. Earthquakes from 
underground injection of wastewater have received much attention lately (Ellsworth, 2013; Horton, 2012; Keranen 
et al., 2014) [6][7][8]. Similar risks have been anticipated for CCS (Zoback and Gorelick, 2012) [9]. Unlikely but 
highly hazardous risks include irreversible drinking water pollution or catastrophic escape of carbon dioxide or 
methane from the site. Each of these risks have the potential to affect nearby residents directly, but they also have 
the potential to contribute to second and third order risks that could, for example, further damage nearby residents 
by degrading home values.  
Finally, hydraulic fracturing and CCS share a similar social narrative. Proponents of both hydraulic fracturing 
and CCS defend the technologies as “bridges” to a low carbon future (Marston, 2008) [10]. Many also claim that the 
technologies provide benefits beyond greenhouse gas mitigation: cheap energy and energy security in the case of 
hydraulic fracturing and recovery of stranded assets in the case of CCS (CarbonTracker, 2013) [11]. Meanwhile, 
some opponents view the technologies as a wasteful and polluting use of resources that could be more productively 
spent on truly “clean” forms of energy such as wind or solar (Markusson et al., 2012) [12]. Others criticize the 
technologies as degrading environmental justice by asking isolated communities to bear the brunt of society’s 
climate change mitigation costs (Markusson et al., 2012) [12]. Lastly, hydraulic fracturing often takes place in 
regions unfamiliar with fossil fuel operations (Deutch, 2012) [13]—a characteristic that carbon storage is likely to 
share—differentiating it from another close proxy: enhanced oil recovery (EOR).  
Of course, it is important to note the differences between hydraulic fracturing and CCS; we must keep these in 
mind as we seek to use fracturing to learn lessons about the social acceptance of CCS. Most importantly, at present 
hydraulic fracturing is a profitable activity while CCS is not. This could change somewhat with the advent of a 
carbon tax or cap and trade program—in that case industry might begin to view hydraulic fracturing as somewhat 
less profitable and view CCS as a cost cutting strategy—but even then hydraulic fracturing would remain an 
extraction technique for a useful energy resource and CCS a disposal technique for an environmental problem.  
Another difference: the geomorphologies of hydraulic fracturing and carbon storage differ considerably. 
Fracturing takes place in relatively impermeable shale formations, which means that fracturing wells draw gas from 
a relatively small volume of substrate compared with the enormous saline formations in which CCS operations 
would likely store carbon dioxide. This has important implications for the degree to which processes like mineral 
rights acquisition, integration, and compensation might differ between hydraulic fracturing and CCS. 
Beyond the practices’ similarities and differences, hydraulic fracturing is a useful test subject for learning about 
potential regulatory regimes for CCS simply because of the wide variety of approaches to regulating the industry. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (NEPA-2005) initiated sweeping changes to the energy industry (U.S. Congress, 
2005) [14], carving out for the hydraulic fracturing industry many exemptions from federal environmental 
regulations. The Act largely exempted most hydraulic fracturing operations from regulation under the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Today, states represent the main entities 
governing the hydraulic fracturing industry. Each state regulates the process differently, based on residents’ 
demographics, preferences, and viewpoints on industry and environmental protection. Hydraulic fracturing is an 
interesting research subject for learning about CCS not because we expect CCS to be regulated at the state level—
federal regulators have already demonstrated an interest in CCS through actions such as EPA’s class 6 well 
regulations—but because the vast range of hydraulic fracturing regulations can help us bracket the form of future 
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CCS regulations and understand how community concerns over carbon storage translate into regulations and 
policies.  
3. Statistical analysis  
3.1. Analysis methodology 
The analysis portion of the study seeks to answer the question: Is there an association between familiarity with 
the oil and gas industry and regulations for shale gas production? This methodology subsection describes the process 
we used to answer the question.  
Our statistical analysis relied on a 2013 dataset of U.S. state-by-state regulatory stringency for the shale gas 
industry. In 2013, Richardson et al. [15] attempted to examine state governance of hydraulic fracturing by 
calculating the relative stringency of 13 “quantitatively regulated elements” for states in which the industry has a 
significant presence. These elements pertained to a variety of hydraulic fracturing procedures, including: setback 
requirements, predrilling water testing, casing depth and circulation rules, water withdrawal limits, freeboard and pit 
liner requirements, wastewater transportation and tracking rules, well idle time limits, temporary abandonment 
limits, and accident reporting requirements. The authors quantified regulations by setting the most stringent state 
regulation in each category equal to 100 and then normalizing the stringency of the same regulation in other states 
according to the resultant percent scale. No state regulated all thirteen items—for example, California did not 
regulate the use of pit liner—and the authors addressed this by assigning each state a “zero stringency” value for 
elements that were apparently unregulated, resulting in the “adjusted stringency” ranking depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In their study, Richardson, et al., performed a series of regression analyses on these regulatory stringency data, 
comparing them against a variety of variables related to demographics, geography, geomorphology, hydrology, 
ecology, oil and gas development, economics, and politics. Despite a rigorous series of analyses, the authors found 
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Fig. 1. Regulatory stringency of hydraulic fracturing. Each state's score represents the percent of fracturing operation elements that state 
regulates out of the total possible population of elements. 
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relatively few statistically significant associations that would explain the heterogeneity in state regulatory stringency 
for hydraulic fracturing. Among their results, however, were the findings that:  
 
• In general, states with more gas wells tend to have more shale gas regulations. 
• A greater proportion of federally owned land in a state is associated with slightly weaker hydraulic fracturing 
regulations.  
• States with a higher degree of surface water and groundwater usage tend to have more stringent hydraulic 
fracturing regulations. 
 
Most importantly, however, Richardson et al, noted that the degree of regulatory heterogeneity for hydraulic 
fracturing appeared largely arbitrary. We sought to build on these findings by examining in greater detail whether 
states with a higher degree of familiarity with the oil and gas industry are associated with a particular level of 
regulatory stringency. Richardson, et al., used regression analyses to identify the effects of a wide variety of 
independent variables, but only two pertained to familiarity: conventional gas wells in 1970 and conventional gas 
wells in 1990. Our analysis built on theirs by including more comprehensive measures of familiarity with the oil and 
gas industry. We relied on four variables as proxies for familiarity: oil production from 1989-2000 (EIA Crude Oil 
Data, 2014) [16], natural gas wells active between 1989 and 2000 (EIA Gas Data, 2014) [17], percent of resident 
workers employed in the oil and gas industry in 2011(American Petroleum Institute, 2013) [18], and percent of state 
GDP due to oil and gas in 2011 (Ibid). We chose these variables based on data availability and because we felt they 
best represented “familiarity” with the oil and gas extraction industry. While post-2000 gas well and oil production 
data were available, we chose to exclude them from the analysis to avoid interactions with the dependent variable—
relative stringency of shale gas regulations. We wanted to analyze how familiarity with oil and gas may have 
affected regulatory stringency, not how regulatory stringency may have affected growth of the oil and gas industry, 
and therefore we needed to truncate the familiarity dataset to the years before hydraulic fracturing accelerated in the 
early 2000s. We could not obtain data on oil and gas sector workforce and revenue characteristics from the 1990s; 
future extensions of this study include reproducing our analysis with such datasets.   
In addition to familiarity data, we analyzed regulatory stringency against 2012 population density (Census.gov 
population estimates, 2012) [19] and “conservative advantage” (Gallup, 2014) [20] in 2013. Population density 
describes the number of residents per square mile. Conservative advantage tallies the difference between the 
percentage of state residents describing their views as conservative and the percentage describing their views as 
liberal (Ibid). We hypothesized that sparsely populated states and conservative states would have lower and less 
variable regulatory stringency. 
Following RFF’s methodology, we began our analysis by using regression to identify how particular levels of 
familiarity were associated with stringency of shale gas regulations in each state. Like RFF, we did not find 
evidence of robust associations. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between familiarity with oil production from 
1989-2000 and regulatory stringency for shale gas in 2013. The blue trend line shows little evidence of a 
relationship, and indeed our simple regression analysis could not find an association with 90 percent statistical 
confidence. Additional plots are available in Appendix A.  
We noticed, however, that the group of states more familiar with relatively high levels of oil and gas production 
had a lower variation in regulatory stringency than the group of states with relatively low production levels. In 
Figure 2, for example, the 14 states to the left of the red dashed line are visually much more spread out than the 13 
states to its right. This observation prompted us to modify our original question to instead ask: Do states that are 
more familiar with the oil and gas industry tend towards a common level of regulatory stringency? 
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Ultimately, we relied on statistical analyses to detect relationships between independent variables and the level of 
variance (or consistency) in regulatory stringency among states. We analyzed the association between familiarity 
and regulatory stringency by performing variance tests to determine whether states with a higher degree of 
familiarity with the oil and gas industry (referred to here as “high familiarity states”) had less variation in regulatory 
stringency than states less familiar with the industry (“low familiarity states”). In essence, these variance tests 
sought to determine whether high familiarity states had a larger degree of cross-state consistency. For each 
familiarity variable, the variance tests compared the bottom 52 percent of states in terms of familiarity to the top 48 
percent (RFF’s dataset contained an odd number of states, making a 50/50 comparison impossible). We 
hypothesized that, for each test, the high familiarity group of states would have a lower variance of regulatory 
stringency than low familiarity group. Note that this could be true even if the mean level of regulatory stringency 
was identical between the two groups. The six scatterplots in Appendix A display the data we sought to analyze for 
each of our variance tests.  
We used two statistical tests to identify the relationship between familiarity and variance of regulatory 
stringency: the F-test and Levene’s test. The F-test is the standard and most commonly used test for assessing 
homogeneity of variances between multiple groups. In this study, we used the F-test to assess the probability that the 
variances for the low familiarity group and the high familiarity group were heterogeneous. However, the F-test 
assumes that the standard error within each group is normally distributed; several of our datasets moderately 
violated this condition. To corroborate the results of the F-test and minimize the risk of erroneous results, we 
conducted an additional statistical test called Levene’s tests. Like the F-test, Levene’s test assesses the heterogeneity 
of variance among multiple groups, but unlike the F-test, it is non-parametric, meaning it does not require normal 
distributions.  
Fig. 2: Regression results- oil production vs. regulatory stringency for shale gas 
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3.2. Analysis results 
We found a robust relationship between familiarity with the oil and gas industry and the variance of regulatory 
stringency across states. For each of our familiarity proxy variables, the high familiarity states had a lower variance 
in regulatory stringency than low familiarity states. That is, the high familiarity group of states was relatively more 
consistent in its regulatory stringency for hydraulic fracturing. Table 1 displays these results, which were statistically 
significant for all measures of familiarity, along with statistics on each group’s mean, range, and standard deviation 
for regulatory stringency. For example, the group of states relatively familiar with oil extraction had less variation in 
regulatory stringency for fracturing than the group of states unfamiliar with oil extraction. Additionally, we found 
that relatively rural states had a lower variance for regulatory stringency than did the group of more urban states. 
Conservative advantage and cross-state regulatory consistency showed some indication of an association, but only 
for Levene’s tests. Detailed results from the tests are displayed in Table B1 in Appendix B. 
 
Table 1: Variance in Regulatory Stringency for Test Groups 
Regulatory 
Stringency 
vs… 
Group Mean  Standard Deviation Range  Variance 
Oil extraction 
1989-2000 
Low familiarity 44.6 18.3 13 – 74  335 
High familiarity 45.9 8.2 28 – 59  67 
Gas wells 
1989-2000 
Low familiarity 40.6 16.2 13 – 74  261 
High familiarity 50.2 9.8 25 – 60  96  
State GDP 
from O&G 
Low GDP share 40.9 17.7 13 – 74  313 
High GDP share 49.9 6.76 42 – 60  46 
Workforce in 
O&G 
Low workforce share 42.1 18.2 13 – 74  332 
High workforce share 48.6 6.92 40 – 60  48  
Population 
Density 
Low population density 47.6 8.57 31 – 61  73 
High population density 42.6 18.37 13 – 74  337 
Conservative 
Advantage 
Low conservative 
advantage 
47.7 16.3 13 – 74  265 
High conservative 
advantage 
42.5 11.4 22 – 60  129 
 
We also constructed violin plots to visually assess differences between groups. Note that violin plots with 
relatively short vertical heights represent relatively low variance. The plots also display median (white dot), range 
(black line), and the middle 50 percent of data (black rectangle). The shape and top-to-bottom height of each plot 
represents the distribution of data. 
Figure 3 illustrates the comparison the regulatory stringency of states familiar with oil extraction with that of 
states unfamiliar with oil extraction. Recall that to build these two groups, we ranked states according to total oil 
production between 1989 and 2000 and then placed the bottom half of states in the “low familiarity” group (left 
violin plot) and the top half in the “high familiarity” group (right violin plot). The low familiarity group ranges from 
a minimum of 13 percent stringency to a maximum of 74 percent stringency, its median is 48.5, and its 25th and 75th 
percentiles are 26.5 and 59.3, respectively. The high familiarity group ranges from 28 to 59, its median is 44, and its 
25th and 75th percentiles are 42 and 52, respectively. Based on the shapes of the low and high familiarity groups, it is 
apparent that the high familiarity group has a tighter distribution, while the low familiarity group is more spread out. 
These observations imply that the high familiarity group has less variation than the low familiarity group. Additional 
plots are included in Appendix C. 
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   The F-test for variance showed, with 99 percent confidence, that three familiarity variables had a statistically 
significant association with regulatory variance: oil production between 1989 and 2000, portion of state GDP due to 
the oil and gas industry, and percent of resident workers in the oil and gas industry. Additionally, the F-test found 
with greater than 95 percent confidence an association between population density and regulatory variance and with 
greater than 90 percent confidence an association between active gas wells between 1989 and 2000 and regulatory 
variance. 
Levene’s test showed an association between all of our independent variables and regulatory variance with at 
least 95 percent confidence. Moreover, the test showed with more than 99 percent confidence that four variables—
oil production, number of gas wells, percent of workforce in the oil and gas industry, and population density—had a 
statistically significant association with regulatory variance.  
4. Case study: Hydraulic fracturing in Pennsylvania and New York State 
4.1. Case study methodology 
To complement the preceding statistical analysis, we conducted a comparative case study on the development of 
hydraulic fracturing regulations and industries in states of New York and Pennsylvania. These case studies allowed 
us to investigate the more nuanced and less quantifiable aspects of social acceptance, and also afforded us the 
chance to identify potential causal mechanisms that could lead to high or low regulatory stringency. Finally, unlike 
our statistical analysis of 2013 shale gas regulations, the case studies allowed us to track the development of 
regulations over time. In summary, we relied on the case study to characterize the process by which a state develops 
a particular level of regulatory stringency.  
We chose to compare New York State and Pennsylvania for two reasons. First, both states lay over the Marcellus 
shale play, which is perhaps the nation’s richest deposit of trapped natural gas (EIA Natural Gas Weekly Update, 10 
July 2014) [21]. Due to the geomorphology shared by New York State and Pennsylvania, hydraulic fracturing 
operations and risks should be relatively unchanged across state borders. Nevertheless, each state has taken a 
different tack in policymaking for hydraulic fracturing. Pennsylvania has largely welcomed the industry, while the 
New York State Assembly recently voted in favor of banning the practice until 2017 (Kuzmich, 2014) [22]. The 
combination of similar geomorphology and dissimilar hydraulic fracturing governance strategies sets the stage for 
an interesting comparison. Second, due to the wealth of natural gas locked in the Marcellus shale, fracturing policy 
developments the Marcellus shale region have been widely reported on and documented. The existence of this 
relatively large trove of case data makes the comparison of New York State and Pennsylvania more comprehensive 
than comparisons of other states. This paper is certainly not the first to compare how regulatory strategies for 
hydraulic fracturing differ between Pennsylvania and New York State (Krancer, Hill, and Tamulonis, 2014; Goho, 
2012) [23][24]. However, to our knowledge it is the first attempt to examine the connections between the regulatory 
front, community acceptance, and industry growth. Moreover, it represents the first time these issues have been 
scrutinized for lessons germane to carbon storage. 
Fig. 3. Distribution of shale gas regulatory stringency (percent) for states familiar and unfamiliar with oil extraction 
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4.2. Comparison of hydraulic fracturing in New York State and Pennsylvania 
The governance structures for hydraulic fracturing in New York State and Pennsylvania are dynamic. One 
common thread between both states is the consistent movement toward regulation at the local level. In fact, this 
process began in 2005, when the US federal government ceded regulatory control of many aspects of fracturing to 
the states. In 2008, as fracturing in the Marcellus region accelerated, New York State instituted a statewide 
moratorium on the industry. That same year, however, local zoning actions aimed at hydraulic fracturing in both 
Pennsylvania and New York State prompted the balance of regulatory power to shift from the state level to the 
municipal level. Interestingly, many of these events took place before hydraulic fracturing reached the attention of 
the US public (see Figure 4).  
 
4.3. National Energy Policy Act of 2005  
Understanding the variation in states’ hydraulic fracturing regulations requires the context afforded by a 
discussion on the National Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Rahm, 2011) [25]. In response to a 1997 groundwater 
pollution incident caused by a coalbed methane fracturing operation in Alabama, the US Court of Appeals for the 
11th Circuit ordered US EPA to regulate hydraulic fracturing under its Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) authority. 
EPA responded to the order by undertaking a study on the risks that coalbed hydraulic fracturing operations posed to 
drinking water supplies, concluding that the practice was safe. That study, which EPA completed in 2004, as well as 
recommendations from the White House Energy Task Force, prompted the passage of the National Energy Policy 
Act (NEPA) of 2005. In passing NEPA, Congress exempted hydraulic fracturing from regulation under the SDWA. 
In its wake, states took responsibility for regulating fracturing to protect human health and the environment, albeit 
with varying degrees of stringency.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Relative increase in US Google searches for terms “fracking” and “hydraulic fracturing” over time. Note that many of the pivotal 
decisions for shale gas development occurred before the issue received heavy internet attention. Internet searches for information on 
hydraulic fracturing did not pick up until after the premiere of the documentary film “Gasland” in 2010. Graph made using Google Trends. 
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4.4. Development of hydraulic fracturing regulations in Pennsylvania 
Hydraulic fracturing did not become a 
major industry in Pennsylvania until 
around 2008, as is evident from Figure 
5. In the first quarter of that year, 
however, leasing prices for mineral 
rights jumped from $300 per acre of land 
to $2100 per acre (Krauss, 2008) [27]. 
Over the next two years, drilling 
increased by nearly five fold. By 2011, 
Pennsylvania accounted for more than 5 
percent of domestic gas supply (EIA, 
2012) [28]. 
As drilling efforts expanded during 
2008 and 2009, a series of incidents, 
including the infamous Dimock 
explosion, prompted many Pennsylvania municipalities to impose local regulations on hydraulic fracturing 
(Food&WaterWatch, n.d.) [29]. Developers and drilling lobbies such as the Marcellus Shale Coalition argued that 
the resulting patchwork of zoning, setback, and safety regulations hampered industry growth by increasing the cost 
of compliance (Detrow, 2012) [30]. Reacting to industry concern in early 2012, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
passed Act 13, which amended the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act to establish standard, statewide zoning and setback 
regulations but simultaneously restricted municipalities’ right to pass similar local regulations (PA Act 13 HB 1950, 
2012) [31]. At least ostensibly, the law was intended to protect human health and the environment while affording 
industry the consistency it needed to continue expanding. To do so, Act 13 relied on a legal principle called 
“preemption,” which allows state authority to supersede and constrain local authority.  
Preemption of local ordinances by state law is not automatic, however. Most states, including Pennsylvania, have 
constitutional provisions called “home rules” granting municipalities regulatory authority over matters of local 
concern (Goho, 2012) [24]. Local ordinances created under the auspices of the home rule are generally protected 
from state interference. The ordinances made possible by the home rule afford municipalities a degree of control 
over the local impacts of oil and gas drilling, potentially bolstering community acceptance for practices such as 
hydraulic fracturing.   Pennsylvania’s constitution in particular contains a section dating back to the 1970s called the 
Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA), which expressly guarantees state residents access to clean air, pure water, 
and preserved natural spaces (Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) [32]. Though the ERA names the 
Commonwealth as the trustee of the environment, municipalities are responsible for implementing regulations and 
ordinances necessary for protecting the local environment (conserveland.org, 2014) [33]. Thus, the amendment is a 
type of home rule, allowing municipalities the latitude to protect the wellbeing of residents by implementing 
ordinances that are limited but nonetheless immune to state interference. In a pair of 2009 cases, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation of the ERA and clarified the relationship between state preemption and 
home rule, explaining that the Commonwealth could preempt local ordinances that dictate fracturing well permitting 
and monitoring procedures but could not preempt local ordinances pertaining to well zoning and setbacks (Goho, 
2012) [24]. For example, the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act could nullify a Dryden, PA, ordinance requiring pre-
drilling testing of a new well, but not an ordinance forbidding drilling within 1000 feet of a residential area. This 
tradeoff between preemption and home rule, state and local governance, helped strike a balance between achieving 
the consistency necessary for the growth of the fracturing industry and protecting the local environmental in order to 
bolster community wellbeing and acceptance.  
With its enactment in February 2012, however, Act 13 amended the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act to preempt 
nearly all local regulations pertaining to hydraulic fracturing (PA Act 13 HB 1950, 2012) [31]. Almost immediately, 
Pennsylvania’s state government faced lawsuit from a group of municipalities, individuals, and interest groups in 
Township of Robinson v. Commonwealth (Krancer, Hill, and Tamulonis, 2014) [23]. In the case’s 2013 decision, the 
court ruled that the preemptive parts of Act 13 were unconstitutional because, in forbidding municipalities from 
Fig. 5: New hydraulic fracturing wells in PA, by year. Data from 
fractracker.org [26] 
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regulating zoning and setback issues, they violated the ERA (J-127A-D-2012) [34]. By invalidating portions of Act 
13, the court in effect transferred responsibility for zoning and setback regulations back to Pennsylvania’s 
municipalities. Interestingly, because the RFF study of state regulatory stringency took place before the court’s 
decision in Township of Robinson v. Commonwealth, a repeat study might show that the stringency of 
Pennsylvania’s state regulations has fallen, even as the state on balance gains regulatory stringency through 
municipal action. The ultimate effects of the case remain to be seen, however. Will a patchwork of inconsistent local 
regulations emerge once again and stymie industry investment?  Will communities be more accepting of hydraulic 
fracturing now that they’ve won a greater degree of regulatory control over the process?  
4.5. Development of hydraulic fracturing regulations in New York State 
Despite occupying the same Marcellus shale play as Pennsylvania, New York State has taken a quite different 
regulatory approach. While the first modern fracturing well in Marcellus began producing only in 2002, the seeds 
for New York State’s moratorium were sown much earlier, in 1978, when the state implemented the State 
Environmental Quality Review Act (NYDEC, 2014) [34]. That act requires that any action that might have a 
“significant adverse environmental impact” be assessed via an Environmental Impact Statement, or “EIS” (NYDEC, 
2014) [35]. In 1992, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC) released a Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for oil, gas, and mineral development. A decade later, hydraulic fracturing 
began in Pennsylvania, and as the gas rush accelerated, companies such as Anschutz Energy began spending 
millions of dollars to accumulate tens of thousands of acres of mineral rights in southern New York State (Ayala, 
2011) [36]. By 2008, the oil and gas companies began to approach NYDEC for drilling licenses and environmental 
activists began to hold community outreach meetings to advocate for stronger drilling regulations (ibid). Of 
particular concern was the integrity of the New York City watershed, which sits directly atop the Marcellus region.  
The concern led to public interest groups and protesters to call for Albany to institute a statewide ban on hydraulic 
fracturing (Ayala, 2011) [36]. In July 2008, Governor Patterson signed an executive order requiring NYDEC to 
update the 1992 GEIS with a new “Supplementary GEIS (SGEIS)” for hydraulic fracturing and forbidding hydraulic 
fracturing until after the release of the SGEIS (Krancer, Hill, and Tamulonis, 2014) [23]. The result was a de facto 
statewide moratorium on hydraulic fracturing, which has been renewed year after year as the NYDEC and 
Department of Public Health work to investigate the environmental and human health effects of hydraulic fracturing.  
The on-going moratorium prevented thousands of landowners and dozens of oil and gas firms from capitalizing 
on the natural gas deposits. By 2008, for example, Anschutz Energy had spent almost $5 million to acquire leases on 
22,000 acres in New York State (Ayala, 2011) [36]. The moratorium not only prevented Anschutz from recouping 
these costs, but also barred landowners from capturing additional royalties for gas extraction. In November 2013, the 
Joint Coalition of Landowners of New York State announced a draft complaint alleging that political motivations 
had prompted the state administration to repeatedly postpone the updating of the SGEIS (Krancer, Hill, and 
Tamulonis, 2014) [23]. The resulting moratorium, the complaint alleged, represented an unconstitutional “taking” of 
mineral rights, an unauthorized seizure of private property (ibid). The group sued in 2014, calling for New York 
State to expedite the SGEIS process (Moody, 2014) [37].  
The latest legal action on fracturing may render the statewide moratorium moot and put New York State on a 
similar regulatory track as Pennsylvania.  Starting in 2011, Dryden and several other New York State towns in the 
Marcellus region essentially banned fracturing through a combination of environmental, noise, and road use 
ordinances (Mufson, 2014) [38]. Anschutz Energy, having anticipated an eventual end to the statewide moratorium, 
sued, claiming that the local zoning regulations violated state oil and gas regulations. During summer of 2014, the 
New York State court of appeals awarded the lawsuit to the towns of Dryden and Middlefield, holding that the 
municipal ordinances limiting fracturing were within the local authority guaranteed under the home rule. The 
majority opinion for the case explained that the justices did not believe the state law explicitly preempted local 
ordinances (Norse Energy v. Town of Dryden, 2014) [39]. The case legitimizes the large number of local fracturing 
regulations emerging across New York State: as of mid-2012, 178 New York State towns had instituted bans on 
fracturing, while 87 had issued binding and nonbinding resolutions supporting industry by prohibiting bans 
(FracTracker.org, 2014) [40]. As in Pennsylvania, fracturing regulations in New York State are moving to the local 
level.  
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5. Conclusions 
Four patterns emerge from this study and provide ample takeaways for a future carbon storage industry. First, by 
all of our measures of familiarity and past experience with oil and gas, our statistical analysis showed that states 
with a robust history of oil and gas development tended to converge on a relatively similar level of regulatory 
stringency for hydraulic fracturing. Conversely, states unfamiliar with oil and gas extraction were more 
unpredictable in their level of regulatory stringency for shale operations: some regulated quite stringently while 
others regulated scarcely at all. Carbon storage firms should try to initially locate in states familiar with oil and gas 
extraction. These states are more likely to have developed a sustainable and predictable balance of regulatory power.  
Second, municipalities are increasingly taking legal action to ensure a high degree of local regulatory control 
over hydraulic fracturing. As states with home rules cede some of their regulatory power, they may appear to 
decrease in regulatory stringency, even as the municipalities within them introduce increasingly strict local 
regulations. This process could explain why states that are relatively familiar with oil and gas tend to converge on a 
medium level of regulatory stringency: these states may have reached equilibrium between regulation at the state 
level and at the local level. The lesson for the carbon storage industry is clear: don’t assume that siting will be easy 
because a state’s oil and gas act appears lax. Municipal ordinances may matter as much or more than state 
regulations. 
Moreover, cities and towns in both New York State and Pennsylvania have utilized zoning laws to impose local 
bans and moratorium over hydraulic fracturing, and have proven themselves willing to defend the legality of such 
ordinances. In turn, courts have tended to side with municipalities, ruling that state oil and gas acts cannot implicitly 
preempt local ordinances protected by the home rule. Such rulings should be viewed as an endorsement of 
municipalities’ right to protect their local environment rather than as a rejection of hydraulic fracturing itself. It is 
unclear whether state oil and gas acts that attempt to explicitly supersede local environmental ordinances would be 
successful in doing so. It is also uncertain whether municipalities could use the home rule to pass pro-fracturing 
ordinances as a means for improving local economic wellbeing. These are areas for future legal research. 
The carbon storage industry should seek to better understand how local regulations and community acceptance 
could impact injection activities. Oil and gas firms have traditionally focused on anticipating and affecting 
regulations at the state level, but storage firms should be prepared to engage decision makers and citizens at the 
municipal level. This need not necessarily lead to dramatic cost increases. Future research should strive to create a 
typology of municipal zoning frameworks such that storage firms can quickly and efficiently respond to local 
concerns and ordinances. 
Third, large urban areas may successfully capture state oil and gas regulations and impose environmental 
restrictions such as statewide bans or moratoria. The most common justification for New York State’s moratorium 
on hydraulic fracturing has been that the New York City watershed lies atop the Marcellus shale play. While local 
fracking regulations may create a “patchwork” problem that drives up industry costs due to inconsistent regulations, 
an emphasis on standardized statewide regulations increases the possibility of such capture by large urban areas. 
This implies a tradeoff: regulatory consistency over large areas may help eliminate the inefficiencies of patchwork 
regulations, but it creates a situation in which anti-CCS policies dominate entire states (or nations). More research is 
necessary to determine how and how often large urban centers influence statewide oil and gas regulations. Carbon 
storage firms should be prepared to at least initially avoid locating operations near large urban centers and their 
watersheds.  
Fourth and finally, many of the most important decisions related to social acceptance of hydraulic fracturing—the 
ERA of 2005, the exponential increase in shale extraction in Pennsylvania, New York State’s moratorium—took 
place before much of the US public had even heard of the technique. The frameworks that emerge from such 
decisions have tended to become “locked in” as the industry developed and public awareness grew. The ERA of 
2005 set the stage for state and local regulation of hydraulic fracturing, and an overarching federal rule is now 
unlikely. While some Pennsylvania municipalities may decide to ban fracturing, the technique has become an 
economic engine for the state and is unlikely to vanish anytime soon. In New York State, political pressure from 
New York City and from environmental activists across the country has compelled the governor to renew the 
moratorium year after year. Carbon storage firms should be prepared to identify and engage decision makers and 
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regulators early, before the issue reaches the national stage. Additional research should characterize how the 
policymaking process changes as issues garner broader public attention.  
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Appendix A. Datasets for Variance Tests 
The scatterplots below display the data we analyzed with each of our variance tests. Each state’s relative level of 
regulatory stringency for shale gas development is plotted against the various familiarity and demographic variables 
discussed previously. The vertical line on each plot, colored red and dashed, denotes the demarcation between test 
groups one and two. For the familiarity variables—historic gas wells, historic oil production, percent of workforce in 
oil and gas, and percent of GDP based on oil and gas—this line marks the division between the low familiarity and 
high familiarity groups. For the population density variable, it marks the division between rural and urban states. For 
the conservative advantage states it marks the division between relatively liberal and relatively conservative states. 
The solid blue line represents the results of a simple regression test, which is displayed here to illustrate trends in the 
data.  
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Appendix B. F-Test and the Levene’s Test Results 
Table B1: Tests results for difference in variance of regulatory stringency between high and low 
familiarity groups 
 
Stringency vs… Variance F-Test Result Levene’s Test Result 
Oil extraction  
‘89-‘00 
Low oil familiarity: 335 
High oil familiarity: 67 
F = 4.98 
p-value =0 .0088*** 
Test Statistic = 11.642 
p-value = 0.000714*** 
Gas wells  
’89-‘00 
Low gas familiarity: 261 
High gas familiarity: 96 
F = 2.7058 
p-value = 0.0945* 
Test Statistic = 5.97 
p-value = 0.007259*** 
State GDP  
from O&G 
Low O&G GDP: 313 
High O&G GDP: 46 
F= 6.847 
p-value = 0.0021*** 
Test Statistic = 4.8357 
p-value = 0.01432** 
Workforce in 
O&G 
Low O&G employment: 332 
High O&G employment: 48 
F = 6.919629 
p-value = 0.0019*** 
Test Statistic = 8.2447 
p-value = 0.002431*** 
Population  
Density 
Low pop density: 73 
High pop density: 337 
F = 0.2177623 
p-value = 0.0105** 
Test Statistic = 16.08  
p-value = 0.000217*** 
Conservative 
Advantage 
Low conservative ad.: 265 
High conservative ad.: 129 
F= 2.060249 
P=value= 0.2205` 
Test Statistic = 3.9624 
p-value = 0.02637** 
 
* Statistically significant with 90 percent confidence 
** Statistically significant with 95 percent confidence 
*** Statistically significant with 99 percent confidence 
‘ Not statistically significant 
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Appendix C. Violin Plots  
 
Distribution of shale gas regulatory stringency (percent)  
for states familiar and unfamiliar with oil extraction 
 
 
 
Distribution of shale gas regulatory stringency (percent) 
for states familiar and unfamiliar with natural gas extraction 
 
 
 
Distribution of shale gas regulatory stringency (percent) 
for states with lower GDP share from O&G industry  
and with higher GDP share from O&G industry  
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Distribution of shale gas regulatory stringency (percent)  
for states with small O&G workforces and with large O&G workforces 
 
 
 
Distribution of shale gas regulatory stringency (percent)  
for states with low and high population density  
 
 
 
Distribution of shale gas regulatory stringency (percent)  
for states with low and high conservative advantage 
 
 
 
 
 
